sexta-feira, 18 de novembro de 2005

Mais vale ser "beur" em Paris que negro em Nova Orleães

Mais vale ser "beur" em Paris que negro em Nova Orleães

THE NEW YORK TIMES (excertos), via Courrier internacional
Nova Iorque


Há dois meses, os franceses olhavam com um fascínio horrorizado o caos de Nova Orleães e viam os membros mais desfavorecidos da sociedade americana a pilhar lojas e a desafiar a polícia após o furacão Katrina. Hoje, enquanto os arruaceiros queimam automóveis e saqueiam lojas nos subúrbios franceses, com uma elevada densidade de população imigrada, as imagens de jovens enfurecidos e de automóveis em chamas vêm infelizmente recordar à França que também ela tem os seus desfavorecidos e o número está a aumentar.

A coincidência dos dois acontecimentos é, sob certos aspectos, reveladora, mas também enganadora. O fosso que existe nos EUA entre os brancos e as minorias, nomeadamente os afro-americanos, é produto de vários séculos de escravatura e de ciclos de pobreza e exclusão racial, que privaram gerações sucessivas daquilo que os EUA tinham de melhor para lhes oferecer. A França também começa a lutar com uma variante do mesmo problema: a fúria dos muçulmanos de origem norte-africana que, há três gerações, estão presos na armadilha da discriminação étnica e religiosa. Mas a França ainda está longe de ter uma classe desfavorecida estrutural — uma classe passível de gerar o extremismo e problemas sociais duradouros.

Milhares de veículos foram incendiados e dezenas de lojas devastadas, em actos de violência, que se estenderam a muitas cidades francesas. Porém, neste momento, a maioria dos arruaceiros parece ter mais interesse em ser protagonista da comunicação social do que em transmitir uma mensagem política coerente.

Por outro lado, estes actos de violência reflectem algo que qualquer americano, que tenha conhecido os levantamentos urbanos dos anos 6o ou os motins de Los Angeles em 1992, reconhecerá: uma parte crescente da população, em particular os jovens, sente-se perigosamente isolada.

Embora muitos americanos pensem que o seu país ainda tem muito a fazer para colmatar o fosso entre os negros e os brancos, os movimentos sociais e os levantamentos dos anos 6o produziram um fluxo de medidas destinadas a melhorar rapidamente as perspectivas políticas e económicas dos membros dos grupos minoritários e a sublinhar a importância da diversidade para a democracia. Por sua vez, o modelo francês tem multiplicado até agora as medidas dispendiosas para alimentar, alojar e educar os muçulmanos pobres, mas ainda não atacou verdadeiramente o problema do isolamento social e político desta minoria, limitando a sua capacidade para se definir a ela própria como um grupo de interesse político. A discriminação positiva, a pedra angular do método americano, é tabu em França. No entanto, como as dificuldades da França são relativamente recentes, talvez tenha uma possibilidade de escapar à gravidade dos problemas dos EUA.

As diferenças

Em primeiro lugar, as condições de vida nos subúrbios franceses não têm nada em comum com as das zonas urbanas pobres dos Estados Unidos. Mesmo nos piores bairros sociais franceses, existem relvados verdes e canteiros de flores, que quebram a monotonia cinzenta do betão. O país tem mais de 700 destes bairros, que agrupam cerca de cinco milhões de pessoas, ou seja, aproximadamente oito por cento da população. O desespero que aí reina é equilibrado por um ensino de bem melhor qualidade do que aquele a que têm direito os bairros pobres habitados pelas minorias americanas, assim como por vastos programas de ajuda social. Mesmo que tenha trabalho, uma família de quatro pessoas que vive em França num apartamento subsidiado pelo Estado, paga, em geral, apenas algumas centenas de dólares de renda por mês e pode receber mais de mil dólares mensais de ajudas diversas. Os desempregados recebem mais apoios, e os cuidados de saúde, assim como a escola, são gratuitos para todos.

A delinquência existe, mas não atingiu o nível de violência gratuita tão temido nos bairros pobres das cidades americanas. As armas de fogo são proibidas e ainda relativamente raras. Quando um adolescente foi abatido, num subúrbio parisiense, por indivíduos armados, no ano passado, o acontecimento fez a primeira página de to dos os jornais do país. A família continua a ser um valor forte nos imigrados, tal como os laços com o país de origem. Mas este tecido social está a desfiar-se, enquanto a segunda e, hoje, a terceira geração de imigrantes nasci dos em França atingem a maioridade.

Muitos jovens originários da imigração interrogam-se sobre o seu verdadeiro lugar a dois níveis. Mantêm com o país dos seus antepassados laços mais fracos do que os pais, mas apercebem-se de que, contrariamente ao que lhes ensinaram na escola não são completamente franceses. E um dos elementos que faz com que certos especialistas temam a emergência em França de uma classe desfavorecida estrutural. Os franceses-árabes e os franceses-africanos já representam a maioria dos detidos nas prisões, tal como as pessoas oriundas das minorias constituem uma parte desproporcionada da população prisional nos Estados Unidos. A concepção francesa de cidadania levanta igualmente problemas. Enquanto os EUA insistem no pluralismo, a França continua a desencorajar tudo o que possa dividir o corpo político francês, segundo linhas étnicas: para todos os franceses, o «communautarisme*» [COMUNITARISMO] sinónimo de guetização, é uma força destrutiva, que aflige, todos sabemos, os Estados Unidos.

Craig S. Smith
* Em francês no texto

1 comentário:

ana disse...

The Wall Street Journal

COMMENTARY

The Hallmark of the Underclass
By CHARLES MURRAY
September 29, 2005; Page A18
Watching the courage of ordinary low-income people as they deal with the aftermath of Katrina and Rita, it is hard to decide which politicians are more contemptible -- Democrats who are rediscovering poverty and blaming it on George W. Bush, or Republicans who are rediscovering poverty and claiming that the government can fix it. Both sides are unwilling to face reality: We haven't rediscovered poverty, we have rediscovered the underclass; the underclass has been growing during all the years that people were ignoring it, including the Clinton years; and the programs politicians tout as solutions are a mismatch for the people who constitute the problem.

* * *

We have rediscovered the underclass. Newspapers and television understandably prefer to feature low-income people who are trying hard -- the middle-aged man working two jobs, the mother worrying about how to get her children into school in a strange city. These people are rightly the objects of an outpouring of help from around the country, but their troubles are relatively easy to resolve. Tell the man where a job is, and he will take it. Tell the mother where a school is, and she will get her children into it. Other images show us the face of the hard problem: those of the looters and thugs, and those of inert women doing nothing to help themselves or their children. They are the underclass.

We in the better parts of town haven't had to deal with the underclass for many years, having successfully erected screens that keep them from troubling us. We no longer have to send our children to school with their children. Except in the most progressive cities, the homeless have been taken off the streets. And most importantly, we have dealt with crime. This has led to a curious paradox: falling crime and a growing underclass.

The underclass has been growing. The crime rate has been dropping for 13 years. But the proportion of young men who grow up unsocialized and who, given the opportunity, commit crimes, has not.

A rough operational measure of criminality is the percentage of the population under correctional supervision. This is less sensitive to changes in correctional fashion than imprisonment rates, since people convicted of a crime get some sort of correctional supervision regardless of the political climate. When Ronald Reagan took office, 0.9% of the population was under correctional supervision. That figure has continued to rise. When crime began to fall in 1992, it stood at 1.9%. In 2003 it was 2.4%. Crime has dropped, but criminality has continued to rise.

This doesn't matter to the middle and upper classes, because we figured out how to deal with it. Partly we created enclaves where criminals have a harder time getting at us, and instead must be content with preying on their own neighbors. But mainly we locked 'em up, a radical change from the 1960s and 1970s. Consider this statistic: The ratio of prisoners to crimes that prevailed when Ronald Reagan took office, applied to the number of crimes reported in 2003, corresponds to a prison population of 490,000. The actual prison population in 2003 was 2,086,000, a difference of 1.6 million. If you doubt that criminality has increased, imagine the crime rate tomorrow if today we released 1.6 million people from our jails and prisons.

* * *

Criminality is the most extreme manifestation of the unsocialized young male. Another is the proportion of young males who choose not to work. Among black males ages 20-24, for example, the percentage who were not working or looking for work when the first numbers were gathered in 1954 was 9%. That figure grew during the 1960s and 1970s, stabilizing at around 20% during the 1980s. The proportion rose again, reaching 30% in 1999, a year when employers were frantically seeking workers for every level of job. The dropout rate among young white males is lower, but has been increasing faster than among blacks.

These increases are not explained by changes in college enrollment or any other benign cause. Large numbers of healthy young men, at ages when labor force participation used to be close to universal, have dropped out. Remember that these numbers ignore young males already in prison. Include them in the calculation, and the evidence of the deteriorating socialization of young males, concentrated in low income groups, is overwhelming.

Why has the proportion of unsocialized young males risen so relentlessly? In large part, I would argue, because the proportion of young males who have grown up without fathers has also risen relentlessly. The indicator here is the illegitimacy ratio -- the percentage of live births that occur to single women. It was a minuscule 4% in the early 1950s, and it has risen substantially in every subsequent decade. The ratio reached the 25% milestone in 1988 and the 33% milestone in 1999. As of 2003, the figure was 35% -- of all births, including whites. The black illegitimacy ratio in 2003 was 68%. By way of comparison: The illegitimacy ratio that caused Daniel Patrick Moynihan to proclaim the breakdown of the black family in the early 1960s was 24%.

But illegitimacy is now common throughout the population, right? No, it is heavily concentrated in low-income groups. Perhaps illegitimacy isn't as bad as we used to think it was? No, during the last decade the evidence about the problems caused by illegitimacy has grown stronger. What about all the good news about falling teenage births? About plunging welfare rolls? Both trends are welcome, but neither has anything to do with the proportion of children being born and raised without fathers, and that proportion is the indicator that predicts the size of the underclass in the next generation.

The government hasn't a clue. Versions of every program being proposed in the aftermath of Katrina have been tried before and evaluated. We already know that the programs are mismatched with the characteristics of the underclass. Job training? Unemployment in the underclass is not caused by lack of jobs or of job skills, but by the inability to get up every morning and go to work. A homesteading act? The lack of home ownership is not caused by the inability to save money from meager earnings, but because the concept of thrift is alien. You name it, we've tried it. It doesn't work with the underclass.

Perhaps the programs now being proposed by the administration will help ordinary poor people whose socialization is just fine and need nothing more than a chance. It is comforting to think so, but past experience with similar programs does not give reason for optimism -- it is hard to exaggerate how ineffectually they have been administered. In any case, poor people who are not part of the underclass seldom need help to get out of poverty. Despite the exceptions that get the newspaper ink, the statistical reality is that people who get into the American job market and stay there seldom remain poor unless they do something self-destructive. And behaving self-destructively is the hallmark of the underclass.

* * *

Hurricane Katrina temporarily blew away the screens that we have erected to keep the underclass out of sight and out of mind. We are now to be treated to a flurry of government efforts from politicians who are shocked, shocked, by what they saw. What comes next is depressingly predictable. Five years from now, the official evaluations will report that there were no statistically significant differences between the subsequent lives of people who got the government help and the lives of people in a control group. Newspapers will not carry that story, because no one will be interested any longer. No one will be interested because we will have long since replaced the screens, and long since forgotten.

Mr. Murray, W.H. Brady Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author, most recently, of "Human Accomplishment" (HarperCollins, 2003).